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This paper outlines an econometric model of the level of burglary in Ireland 
between 1952 and 1998. We explain the evolution of the trend in Burglary in 
terms of demographic factors: in this case the share of young males in the 
population, the macro-economy in the form of  consumer expenditure and two 
characteristics of the criminal justice system : the detection rate for these 
crimes  and the size of the prison population. The share of young males is 
associated with higher levels of these crimes. Imprisonment and detection act 
as powerful forces for reducing crimes, the effects of aggregate consumption 
are more difficult to pin down but we show that higher spending is associated 
with more lucrative but probably fewer crimes. One somewhat surprising result 
is that we were unable to find any robust effect from direct measures of labour 
market activity such as unemployment rates or wage levels. 
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 1 Introduction 
Crime matters to people. The direct victims of crime, in addition to the immediate 
impact of the violence, loss of property and so on, report levels of anxiety and 
stress for some time after the event. The effects of the crime are not limited to 
these victims (and their families) alone. Society as a whole feels threatened by the 
level of crime. This can affect people’s lives in many ways. Individuals may be 
reluctant to venture out for fear of assault or fear that their property will be stolen. 
They may go to extra expense to minimize the chances of being victimized. There 
may also be a lower level of trust in the community: to use current terminology 
“social capital” is damaged. Those responsible for crime are not drawn randomly 
from the population. The international evidence is that being young, male, with low 
education and low income is associated with being involved in crime. So wider 
considerations of social justice also suggest that crime is an important policy 
concern. 
However rising crime is not inexorable. Although it is currently high in Ireland by 
historic standards it has fallen significantly in recent years. The actions of the 
courts, the probation services, the Garda Síochána (the police in Ireland) and the 
legal system are likely to matter. There are of course other factors, amenable to 
public policy, which may also influence crime such as the level of unemployment, 
education or inequality.  
It follows then that understanding the determinants of the level of crime is important 
in thinking about reforms to public policy to further reduce crime levels. We 
emphasize that policy towards criminal justice is a complicated matter involving a 
host of legal, social and other issues. The causes of the level of one particular type 
of crime constitutes one piece of the jigsaw puzzle. Perhaps surprisingly, research 
on the determinants of crime is in its infancy in Ireland. In this paper we carry out 
one of the first econometric analyses of crime in Ireland and the first for nearly 
twenty years.   
The major breakthrough in this field is the work of Becker(1968). In Becker's 
model, criminals are rational individuals acting in their own self interest. In deciding 
  2to commit a crime, criminals weigh the expected costs against the expected 
benefits.  So some individuals will choose to commit crimes because they value 
the benefits – say property taken - more than the expected cost to them. The cost 
of crime will be an opportunity cost, it is what they give up to pursue the crime.  
This can include working in the legitimate economy. If jobs are easier to come by 
and/or such jobs are well paid then the opportunity cost of crime is higher. 
However crime is essentially a risky activity for the criminal and he/she needs to 
take into account the chance of being caught and the outcome for him/her in the 
event of being caught such as imprisonment.  Of course there are other factors 
which will influence individuals decisions to commit crime, the attitudes of society to 
crime, the attitudes of one’s family and so on. However we do not explicitly 
consider them here either because there is simply no way of measuring them or 
because they are intrinsically “micro” level variables which will influence individuals 
but are unlikely to explain trends in the aggregate level of crime. Here we are 
concerned with burglary and crimes against property more generally and it seems 
plausible that the “cost/benefit” approach is a sensible way of thinking about it.  It is 
clear that there are types of crime, sexual or political crimes for example, for which 
this would not be the most useful framework. 
A different perspective on understanding crime tends to emerge from sociological 
analyses which sees crime as a form of social dysfunction. This idea is associated 
with the French sociologist Durkheim’s notion of anomie - feelings of alienation and 
rootlessness amongst individuals. There is no necessary contradiction between 
such a view and the approach taken here since it is difficult if not impossible to test 
such a model. For example it is difficult to know how one could consistently 
measure the trend in anomie over a period of 30 or 40 years. Possible indicators 
would be the level of suicide or the level of inequality, the former a consequence 
and the latter a cause of the phenomenon. In the first case however we know that 
measured trends in suicide are probably a poor guide to the underlying 
phenomenon since they will reflect changing attitudes, changes in reporting 
practice and so on. In the second case, although both economic and sociological 
  3analyses would see a rôle for economic inequality affecting crime there is simply 
not enough data to use. 
As discussed, the "cost" of crime to criminals consists of two parts. One is the 
income foregone by devoting time to criminal activity (the opportunity cost). The 
second cost is the time criminals expect to be incarcerated because of their 
activity. "Expected punishment" is not the same as the length of time a convicted 
criminal actually spends in prison. Most crimes never result in an arrest and many 
of those arrested are not prosecuted. Many convicts receive non-custodial 
sentences.  
Expected punishment, from the criminal's viewpoint, is a probability, not a certainty.  
For example, in figures cited by Rubinstein and Woodson (1995) only 7% of U.S. 
burglaries result in an arrest according to the National Center for Policy Analysis 
(NCPA).  Of those arrested, 87% are prosecuted and of those prosecuted, 79% 
are convicted. Of those convicted, a mere 25% are sent to prison (most are 
paroled).  After multiplying these probabilities, we see that a potential burglar faces 
only a 1.2% chance of going to prison for each act of burglary committed and that 
once in prison, she/he will stay there for about 13 months. But since she/he will 
escape imprisonment more than 98% of the time, the expected "cost" of each 
burglary to the burglar is only 4.8 days.  
The rational criminal will ask him/herself whether an act of burglary is likely to net 
him/her goods worth more than 4.8 days behind bars. If the answer is yes, then the 
crime pays.   The goal of the criminal justice system is to raise expected costs of 
crime to criminals above the expected benefits. People will commit crimes only so 
long as they are willing to pay the prices society "charges."   
Since Becker’s seminal work economic research into the topic of crime has 
focused on a simple model with three elements – the supply of criminal activity, the 
size of the punishment and the probability of arrest and conviction with the latter 
two elements forming the main weapons available for deterrence of crime.  Supply 
of crime should, in this simple economic model, decline if the offence is more likely 
to be detected or more likely to carry a heavy sentence hence the motivation 
  4toward policies such as increased police coverage, closed circuit television and 
reviews of sentencing strategies.   
However the market will have its imperfections.   Criminals for example may be 
poorly informed about the chance of being caught and the implications of this for 
their liberty.  Moreover for criminals to react in the manner of the simple model 
suggest that they are risk averse but this may not be the case. Individuals who 
enjoy risk may be attracted to crime as a lifestyle.    
If criminals are rational they will also respond to the relative ‘prices’ of different 
crimes and move from crimes that are heavily punished to lighter crimes in 
punishment terms.  
Criminology is a very under-developed field of research in Ireland and the rigorous 
statistical or economic analysis of data is the exception rather than the rule. The 
nature of the activity, being illegal, necessarily makes data collection difficult and 
hampers micro-level research in particular. There are nonetheless several 
important contributions worth noting.  
Virtually the only economic analysis of crime in Ireland that we are aware of is 
Bacon and O' Donoghue (1977). This applies the model of Becker to Ireland to 
analyse what the optimal levels of expenditure on crime control should be. While 
most of this paper is not directly relevant to the proposal, they do include an 
econometric analysis of the determinants of crime, distinguishing between violent 
and non-violent crime. They find that unemployment has positive and negative 
effects respectively on these two categories. This is somewhat at odds with results 
for other countries though the crime categories do not correspond exactly. 
The ESRI report by David Rottman (1980) analyses the aggregate trends in the 
data with a largely sociological focus. It pays particular attention to the quality of the 
data and notes the relatively good data on crime that can be derived from the 
annual reports of the Garda Síochána. It also carries out a basic statistical inquiry 
into the trends in the data.  In particular it regresses the level of crime in nine 
different categories on the level of unemployment.  
  5For most types of property crimes in particular  there is a well determined and 
positive effect. Interestingly for assault, he finds a negative impact, a finding which 
is mirrored in subsequent research on US data using much more advanced 
estimation methods (see for example Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 1999). The 
techniques used by Rottman are, certainly to a contemporary reader, relatively 
unsophisticated. Nonetheless it provides a good introduction both to the data and 
the possibilities for statistical analysis. 
McCullagh (1992) discusses the relationship between imprisonment and 
unemployment between 1951 and 1988 and concludes that there is a positive 
relationship but only in the latter part of the period. Disappointingly, his method is 
based on a visual inspection of the data and completely eschews any statistical 
testing. The calculation of simple correlation statistics would have been very useful 
and is easily done. His conclusion that "analyses based on forms of multi-
regression may disguise more than they reveal about the data under examination" 
is not well founded. Since one does not expect crime to be determined solely by 
any one variable, the simple correlation between crime and unemployment, say, is 
of no particular significance. 
An interesting micro level study is the paper by Bacik et al (1998). They modelled 
the probability of a custodial sentence as a function of characteristics of the 
individuals and the communities from which they are drawn. The authors collected 
a large sample of cases from the Dublin District Court. Their results show that 
those who come before the courts are not typical of the population, being 
predominantly male, young and from more deprived areas. While this by itself is 
unsurprising, as the authors note, the degree to which this holds is striking. Using 
multivariate methods, they show, inter alia, that among those appearing in court, 
being from a deprived area is associated with a higher probability of receiving a 
custodial sentence. This probability is decreasing in age but is higher if the crime in 
question was a property offence.  
While the results are very interesting, interpretation is less straightforward. For 
example the age result could reflect a judges' reluctance to incarcerate older 
individuals perhaps because of family responsibilities. It could equally reflect the 
  6nature of the crime, maybe younger people are associated with more serious 
offences. The analysis includes controls for class of offence (property, drugs, public 
order etc) but within these classes there will be variation in the degree of 
seriousness. Another problem is that in this data not receiving a custodial sentence 
includes those convicted but not imprisoned and those who were acquitted.  
Nonetheless this study provides an excellent example of the ability of modern 
statistical methods to measure the influence of different factors on a variable of 
interest. It would be highly desirable if micro-level data were collected to allow 
further research along these lines. 
Also worth noting is a recent study by O'Mahoney (1997) which studies the 
characteristics of a sample of prisoners in Mountjoy Prison. This emphasises the 
fact that at the micro level, crime is strongly associated with individuals who are 
young, poorly educated and generally economically disadvantaged. 
The significance of these last two micro-studies for the proposed research is that 
they largely confirm the finding of much international research. As the Whittaker 
(1985) report puts it "most crime at present originates amongst unemployed youth 
in disadvantaged areas". 
The relationship between crime and the labour market has been a major issue in 
the US and UK research.  Freeman (2000) suggests that there is little direct 
evidence linking education to reductions in crime and the perceived linkage relates 
to the effect that education has on factors such as unemployment and inequality.  
There has been a dramatic rise in crime over the period 1950 to 1997 – reported 
crime rose by a factor of 3 in the US and by a factor of 2 in the UK. Moreover the 
significant rise in wage inequality that has been observed in the US and Great 
Britain over the past 25 years suggests that the return to legitimate work has fallen 
for low or unskilled individuals.   This is especially true for men.    
Estimates of the return to crime are harder to gauge – again US figures suggests 
that criminal earnings for inner city youths rose by an average of 5% over the 
period of the 1980’s.  This, when coupled with downward changes in the probability 
of incarceration for youths in the US during the same periods suggests that crime 
  7rates do react to labour market condition and that this behavior may indeed be 
rational for some individuals.  Upward trends in inequality are associated with 
higher levels of both property and violent crime (see Kelly(2000) or Witt et 
al(1999)).  Winter-Ebmer and Raphael (1999) find positive effects of 
unemployment on crime that are not just statistically significant but large in size.  
Leigh (1998), in a review of work published in this area, concludes that increased 
education is positively and strongly correlated with absence of violent crime, 
measures of health, family stability and environmental benefits. 
Lochner (1999) develops and estimates a model of the decisions to work, to 
become educated and to commit crime and allows for the possibility of interactions 
between all of these choices. The model suggests that education is correlated with 
crimes that require less skill.  Part of the model allows for simulation of the effects 
of education subsidies on external outcomes and predicts that education subsidies 
reduce crime.   Insofar as possible, empirical implications were explored using 
various large scale US micro datasets.  Ability and high school graduation 
significantly reduce the participation of young men in crime and the probability of 
incarceration.  Evidence from the census data supports a general finding that 
states with higher rates of high school participation and tougher penalties have the 
lowest index for property crime.   
The influence of the criminal justice system of the level of crime is one of the topics 
that has attracted most interest and indeed most controversy. The variables that 
one might expect to have an influence include the level of policing, imprisonment, 
sentencing policy. For example the influential study by Ehrlich(1975) argues that 
capital punishment deterred murder though these conclusions have attracted 
significant criticisms, for example Hoenack and Weiler(1980).  
A potentially important issue is that there may be simultaneity as higher crime rates 
generate responses by policy makers such as increasing police resources. From 
early on in the literature the approach has been to estimate simultaneous equation 
systems , see Thaler(1977) for an early contribution or Van Tulder and Van Der 
Torre(1999) for a recent effort. The identifying assumptions made are often rather 
weak and difficult to justify.   
  8An alternative approach is to use “natural experiments” where available. Levitt 
(1996) suggests using exogenous factors that limit the use of incarceration in the 
United States such as caps on prison populations as providing an independent 
influence on incarceration.  His study uses the number of state litigation suits for 
violation of prison directives as a means of isolating the effect of punishment levels 
on crime rates.  In this work a 10% increase in imprisonment rates would lead to a 
0.7% decrease in property crime and a 1% decrease in violent crime using 
conventional methods.  However using the more sophisticated methodology 
suggests that these figures are underestimated with the ‘corrected’ effects of a 
10% increase in imprisonment rates being 4% for violent crime and a reduction of 
3% for property crime.   This shows the importance of paying careful attention to 
the use of appropriate statistical methods since they lead to estimates of the effects 
which are a multiple of the naïve estimates. 
In his 1997 paper, Levitt suggests that during election years police forces tend to 
swell.   He therefore uses US local elections to model the problem and again finds 
large differences between the conventional models and the ‘corrected’ one. For 
property crime he estimates that a 10% increase in the number of police officers 
reduces property crime by about 1.5%-3.8% depending on the precise 
methodology used.  This implies a decline in reported property crimes per police 
officer of between 4 and 12.4 per officer annually. Taken in conjunction with similar 
effects on violent and other crime that Levitt estimates in this study, this all 
translates into an additional social benefit of over $200,000 from the hiring of one 
additional police officer
1.  The extent of the problem (and the applicability of this 
solution) may be less in Ireland where it takes some time to increase the size of the 
Garda Síochána. 
A number of other experiments have been carried out largely in the United States.  
For example California’s ‘Proposition 8’ imposed enhancements to sentences for a 
select group of crimes particularly for re-offenders.  In the year following the 
passage of the legislation the Proposition 8 offences recorded reductions of 10% 
                                                       
1 Levitt also makes the point that his study is based on reported crimes only.  As criminals do not know if a crime 
will be reported or not it seems logical to translate the effects on reported crime into unreported crime.   In any 
event reporting bias, if present, will understate the true effectiveness of police in reducing crime. 
  9relative to unchanged crimes.  Three years after the law came into effect eligible 
crimes had fallen by 20-40% compared to other crimes. This brings out a 
significant advantage that researchers have with de-centralised judicial systems, 
changes in state laws act as "natural experiments" allowing one to observe the 
effects of changes in variables in one state compared to another. This is much 
more difficult to do where reforms are only at a national level as in Ireland. 
In interpreting the effect of imprisonment on reducing crime a distinction exists 
between whether it works though deterrence, lowering the expected return to 
crime, and incapacitation, the direct effect of criminals being unable to commit 
crime while in prison.  It is not hard to see that it will be difficult to distinguish 
between the two .  Levitt (1995) found for the US that deterrence is more important 
than incapacitation for minor crimes and the deterrence effects are generally 
negative.  Deterrence effects were large for burglary (each arrest is estimated to 
eliminate two burglary crimes). 
 
2 Data 
In this section we describe the availability and quality of data that is either 
necessary for an exercise such as this or that might be conceivably useful given 
the issues arising in the first half of the report.  
We first discuss data specifically related to crime including alternative measures of 
our dependent variable and then go on to discuss the situation vis-à-vis the 
demographic and economic variables that are likely to be used as covariates or 
explanatory factors. As with most such studies the amount of data declines as one 
goes back in time so there is an inevitable trade off: if one wishes to focus on more 
subtle measures, say of economic activity, then one may be constrained to use a 
much shorter time-span. A further issue concerned the quality of the data since 
even if the data exists one may have reason to doubt the reliability of the 
information in which case there may be an argument for foregoing its use.  
  10Although the Central Statistics Office was founded in 1949 economic data in 
Ireland is relatively scarce before 1960.
2 In our search for data we have taken 1950 
as our starting point since there is very little before this. Econometric analysis of the 
Irish economy typically starts with data from around 1960 or later it is unlikely that 
trying generate a dataset that starts before 1950 would be practical. Perhaps 
ironically, consistent series on crime variables precedes many of the key 
macroeconomic time series.  
The source of the crime data is the annual Reports of the Garda Síochána. Crime 
data is also published in the Statistical Abstract of the CSO but this source offers 
no particular advantage. These reports are in general a very useful consistent 
source of the basic data which we wish to analyse. Note that there is considerable 
debate in the international research literature as well as amongst Irish researchers 
about the reliability of official statistics. Under-reporting is well known to be a 
potential problem but to an extent to which, almost by definition, is hard to 
ascertain. Here we have taken the data at face value since there seems little 
alternative and evaluation of the data is beyond the remit of the study. Further 
research on this issue is clearly desirable, possibly though regular surveys such as 
the recent ESRI survey, Watson (2000). It may also be useful to analyse data on 
insurance claims as an additional source of information. The only study that we are 
aware that explicitly addresses the question of statistical inference associated with 
under-reporting of crime is Pudney et al (2000). Their investigation, using British 
data, leads them to the conclusion that it is  "of little practical significance". 
The Garda reports classify crimes into four groups of which the second, Group 2, 
Crimes against property with violence, is relevant for us. We have extracted the 
data for burglary from these reports from 1950 until 1999. However we propose to 
use only data up to and including 1998 for two reasons. Firstly the data for 1999 
refers only to the period January-September due to the introduction of the PULSE 
system of collecting crime data. Clearly it is not directly comparable with data 
based on a full year given especially that crime displays a strong seasonal 
                                                       
2 Prior to this much of the collection and publication of data fell to the Statistics Division of the Department of 
Industry and Commerce.  
  11component, being greater in the winter. We hope that this data will subsequently 
be revised at some point to refer to the whole year.  
In principle one could attempt to seasonally adjust the data for 1999: by using 
within-year variation in crime for earlier periods to impute the “missing crime” for 
the last quarter of 1999. However this would be a significant undertaking for a 
relatively small return and one that would introduce an additional source of error 
into the data. The second reason is that not all our covariates can be observed for 
1999. 
There is one issue in the construction of the basic burglary series data worth noting 
namely that there is a change in reporting in 1977 which amalgamated a number of 
different series to create a new burglary series. Up to and including 1976 there is 
data on the following offences: (i) Sacrilege (i.e. theft from places of worship), (ii) 
Burglary, (iii) Housebreaking, (iv) Breaking into shops, warehouses or other 
premises, (v) Attempts to break into shops and houses, (vi) Entering with intent to 
commit a felony and (vii) Possession of House-breaking tools. From 1977 onwards 
there is one series which, as far we can see, is the sum of the first five of these. Of 
the six categories listed above (iii) and (iv) account for the bulk of the total.   We 
give data for the relevant period below 
 
Table 2.1  Monitoring the Definition Changes in Burglary Data 
  (i)  (ii)  (iii)  (iv)  (v)   (vi)  (vii)  Sum of (i) 
to (vii) 
1975  76 556  5840  7194  348  111
6 
30 15160 
1976  57  10291  4871 3372  168  382 36  19177 
1977   21009        22 21031 
1978   18923        22 18945 
 
There is one further complication to be aware of, due to the changing reference 
period used in Garda Reports. Up to and including 1957 the reporting year ended 
in December. From 1958 to 1974 inclusive the reporting year ended in September 
after which it reverted to the end of December again. 
  12In this section we do a simple regional breakdown of the data. This could be an 
important issue since one might expect differences in the nature or urban and rural 
crime. However this is not straightforward to do. Burglary data is only 
disaggregated spatially from a relatively late date which would give too short a 
period of data to analyse econometrically. However an alternative approach is 
possible. As noted above Burglary comes under the class of data recorded as 
Offences against property with violence or "Group 2" in the statistics. These series 
are consistently provided at a Division level and we have collected them for Dublin, 
Cork, Limerick, Galway and Limerick. We have aggregated these five series under 
the heading “Urban”. By subtracting the “Urban” figure from the totals for Ireland we 
get a  “Rural” series. We think this is the best feasible way in which a spatial 
disaggregation can be pursued. Figure 2.1 graphs the time series of both Burglary 
(based on our amalgamation of the pre-1977 data discussed above) and the 
Group 2 data from 1950 on. The share of the former in the latter is not constant 
see Figure 2.2 and drops significantly in recent decades.   
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The fall in both series from the mid 1990s is evident. Unpublished data from the 
Department of Justice, Equality and Law Reform for 1999 and 2000 indicate that 
this trend is continuing, with the numbers of burglaries for those years being 
23,042 and 20,477 respectively. So burglary for last year (2000) is now down to 
79% of the 1998 figure and is lower than it has been since 1982. 
To give an idea of the differences between burglary and the category of crimes 
against property with violence Table 2.2 below gives a breakdown for two years. It 
can be seen that burglary accounts for the bulk of these crimes, over 88% in 1980 
and a small number of other categories account for the remainder. As can be seen 
in Figure 2.2 the share of burglary in crimes against property falls over the 1980s 
and 1990s and this would appear to be largely accounted for by a greater 
incidence of malicious damage against property (including schools).   It needs to 
be borne in mind therefore that in analysing the trend in crimes against property 
one is looking at a class of crime whose internal composition is to some extent 
changing.  However the reasons as to why malicious damage to property 
increases in significance is one that is beyond the scope of this study. 
  
 
  14Table 2.2  Crimes against property with violence (“Group 2”) 
 
 
 1980    1998   
Burglary  2,1974     88.3%  25,730     69.2% 
Aggravated burglary       201     0.8%                657     1.8% 
Robbery       939     3.8%  1,831     4.9% 
Malicious damage to 
property 
  1,318     5.3%  8,223     22.1% 
Other       446     1.8%        750     2.0% 
Total  24878    100%  37191     100% 
 
A convention in much of the literature is to normalise the burglary series by dividing 
by the population and this is shown in Figure 2.3 while Figure 2.4 shows the share 
of “Urban” (as defined above) in total group 2 crimes. 
 
 






























































The simple frequency of crimes, that is the number of offences recorded, can be 
misleading or at least may be only partially informative, since it says nothing about 
the severity of the crime. An alternative approach is  therefore to have a measure 
of crime that weights individual offences in some way with “bigger” robberies 
contributing more to the overall trend than lesser crimes. For crime against 
property a natural weighting would be based on the value of property stolen so that 
a crime in which £100 is taken is equivalent to two crimes in which £50 each is 
taken. This is not to say that this is the only, or even the ideal, measure of the trend 
in the crime in question. If it is the experience of being burgled (or otherwise 
victimized) rather than the property stolen that is of concern to individuals and 
society then the simple frequency of crimes may be the appropriate measure. 
Alternatively one might wish to weight the crimes by the numbers of victims so that 
the burglary of a household with two people counts for more than that of a single 
person household. This however raises the question of how one should weight 
non-residential properties. 
So underlying the decision of whether to use a weighted or unweighted measure is 
to some extent a value judgement and also a question of data availability - it is not 
possible for example to weight burglary crimes by the numbers of residents in the 
household. Our view is that both approaches have merit and hence we also 
  16estimate the same model specification but with a weighted measure - the average 
value of property stolen- as dependent variable.  



































The Garda reports contain a series on the value of property stolen for Group 2 
crimes though not for burglary. Data is also presented on the number of crimes on 
which the value series is based – these are a subset of all Group 2 offences. Data 
is also available on the value of property recovered. This may be useful as an 
index of deterrence since there may be less incentive to steal if there is a high 
probability of it being recovered. 
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Figure 2.5 graphs the value series, deflated by the Consumer price Index (indexed 
1950=1). The three “spikes” in the data at 1974, 1983 and 1986 are striking. An 
obvious question which can be asked is whether and to what extent these spikes 
can be explained by an increased frequency of crimes. So in Figure 2.6 we graph 
the value series divided by the number of cases, which hence corresponds to the 
average value of property stolen (in real terms). This to some accounts for the 
spikes in 1983 and 1986 which are now much less pronounced. The Garda reports 
for  1974 and 1986 identify one particular crime in each of those years and give the 
value taken (see data appendix) so we simply adjust the series by subtracting the 
amount. For 1983 we were unable to explain the spike, instead we replace the 
observation for that year with the mean of the 1982 and 1984 data. More 
complicated methods of imputation are available but we believe this method is 
adequate. 
As explanatory variables we propose to consider a small number of key 
demographic and economic variables which the international literature has 
suggested as determinants of property crime. In addition one may wish to consider 
  18variables representing the criminal justice system which may act as deterrents to 
criminal activity. We use two variables under this heading one relating to detection 
of crime and one to imprisonment. For the latter we use the daily average number 
of people in prison from the CSO’s Statistical Abstract augmented by the report of 
the Prison Service. Figure 2.7 graphs this for the period of interest.   


























































For detection rates we use the number of indictable offences in group 2 detected 
by the Gardaí, there is no figure available specific to burglary. The data can also be 
broken down regionally which is useful. The detection data as a proportion of the 


























































The detection rates broken down into an Urban series ("drateurb") and a Rural 
series ("draterur") earlier are in Figure 2.9.  As can be seen they follow a very 
similar pattern. 
















































There are a number of reasons why one might want to use demographic data.  As 
noted above one may want data on total population to scale the number of crimes 
so that one analyses “burglary per head of population”. Whether to model this or 
the simple level of burglary is to some extent a matter of taste and the literature is 
divided on which is the best to use. In this study we do not divide the crime data by 
population. A more important reason is that the age and gender composition of the 
population is likely to be important since the international evidence is that crime, at 
least of the sort considered here, is largely committed by young males. The 
evidence for Ireland is consistent with this. Fortunately all, or almost all, of the 
demographic data that one needs is available in one source the ESRI Time Series 
Databank, developed and provided by John Fitzgerald and Jonathan Hore. This 
gives population broken down into four age categories (0 to 14, 15-24, 25 to 64, 
65+) for males and females separately from 1950 to 1999.  
  21We construct a variable which is the share of young males in total population. 
“Young” in this context means between the ages of 15 and 24 inclusive. This series 
is graphed in Figure 2.10. 

































































We have experimented with a number of macroeconomic variables. Perhaps 
surprisingly only one was found to feature consistently so we end up with quite a 
parsimonious specification. Amongst the variables we considered are the level of 
real wages, the rate of unemployment and the level of migration. The variable that 
we did use is consumer expenditure, in real terms, per capita. It should be noted 
that the recent United Kingdom Home Office studies (Field(1999), Dhiri et al(1999)) 
also find a crucial role for consumer spending.  Another variable which would be a 
close substitute for consumer spending would be GNP per capita. Figure 2.11 
illustrates the series that we have used. 
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3  Results 
In this section we present the econometric analysis that is the core of this report. 
We first outline some important statistical preliminaries. We then present the 
estimated model of burglary using data from 1957 to 1998. As will be clear from the 
section on methodology this proceeds in two steps, the first estimating the long run 
relationship between a set of variables and the second considering short run 
responses. Following the analysis of burglary we consider the analysis of a broader 
class of crime, crime against property with violence.  As explained earlier we do 
this to model separately  the trends in rural and urban crime. We also present a set 
of estimates of the determinants of the average value (in monetary terms) of 
property crimes.   
The choice of variables used in the analysis is clearly crucial. It is also particularly 
problematic in an exercise such as this since existing theory, economic and 
otherwise, gives only fairly weak guidance as to what should and should not be 
included. By contrast, for example, in looking at say the demand for money, there 
is a large body of empirical and theoretical research which places strong 
restrictions on the form of the model.  
After a certain amount of experimentation we isolated four variables as 
determinants of crime. One is demographic: the share of young males in the total 
population. This is consistent with a lot of international evidence and some for 
Ireland that young males are the group most likely to commit crime, particularly the 
sort considered here.  There is one variable which reflects the general level of 
"prosperity" of the economy: real consumer spending per capita.  Note that 
consumption was found to be the driving force in the recent UK study cited earlier. 
An alternative one could use which gives very similar results is GNP per capita 
inflation adjusted.  
What is striking however is the absence of any labour market variable. Neither the 
level of wages nor the rate of unemployment appear in the model. This might seem 
unusual since the economics of crime emphasizes the importance of opportunity 
  24cost: as legitimate labour market activity becomes less rewarding the relative return 
to crime becomes more attractive. Nonetheless we were unable to detect a robust 
effect of the labour market on the level of crime given the other variables included. 
It is worth noting that a recent study for New Zealand (Papps and Winkelmann, 
1998) cite evidence that just one half of studies of the crime/unemployment relation 
find a positive effect with the remainder finding no such effect.  
There is an important issue that needs to be remembered: one should think of the 
macro-economy as generating at least two conflicting effects on crime. As an 
economy becomes prosperous, some criminals may switch away from illegal 
activities because the opportunity cost of engaging in crime is now higher. On the 
other hand there is also more to steal, so the rewards to a given crime are higher 
because peoples homes have more and better goods in them. Ideally one would 
be able to isolate these two effects but if they cannot be distinguished empirically 
what one observes is the "net effect" of the two opposing forces. An additional 
possibility is that as consumers have more money to spend they allocate additional 
resources to security in the form of burglar alarms and so on and this acts to 
depress burglary. 
Finally we have two variables reflecting features of the criminal justice system: the 
average level of custody i.e. numbers in prison and detection rates of Group 2 
crimes. Again it is important to note that controlling for one variable has 
implications for how we interpret the presence of absence of another variable. 
Therefore the fact that a measure such as the number of serving Garda Síochána 
does not appear in the model does not mean that they have no effect. Rather their 
effect works through the level of custody and the detection rates. Holding the latter 
constant it would be surprising if Garda numbers had an independent effect. 
We use the Grainger Engle(1987) 2 step Error Correction Mechanism (ECM) 
approach which is widely used in modelling aggregate time series data in a range 
of areas including crime trends.  In has the advantage of easily distinguishing 
between short and long run determinants of the crime rate. It is possible that some 
of the variables we consider feature as long run determinants of the crime rate but 
not in the short run or vice versa.   
  25We establish using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test that a set of variables of 
interest are all I(1).
3  We test for the presence of one or more cointegrating vectors 
using the Johansen procedure. Since we are able to identify a unique vector we 
estimate this vector by OLS which is "super consistent" (i.e. o(n) ). We then 
estimate a differenced version of the model but including the lagged residuals from 
the static model. Since all these regressors are I(0), inference can proceed as 
usual.  For two covariates,say, this amounts to first estimating  
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Estimating the system in one step gives very similar results , in this case: 
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ECM's are now commonly used in modelling crime rates; in addition to the UK 
studies cited, recent work on Italy (Scorcu and Cellini 1998) and Germany (Entorff 
and Spengler 2000) use this approach.  
 
Based on our discussion above the model is developed by estimating long run 
‘cointegrating ’ relationships between recorded property crime and other factors, 
and  by estimating short run relationships which are corrected for the presence and 
effect of the underlying equilibrium level of crime 
We first estimate whether or not the variables of interest can form a cointegrating 
regression.   Table 3.1 outlines this first stage of the process, which can be thought 
of in its own right as estimating the effect of the independent variables on the long 






                                                       
3 See the appendix for details. Using the non parametirc Phillips Perron test gives identical results. 
  26Table 3.1:   Estimating the long run relationship 
Dependent Variable – Log of the National Burglary level 
 
 Estimated  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Young Males as %  Population (Log)  3.852*  0.542 
Consumption (Log)  -0.297  0.260 
Custody Rate (Log)  -0.886*  0.190 
Detection Rate   -3.245*  0.303 
Trend   0.054*  0.008 
Constant -78.865*  15.225 
     
N  41   
Adjust R
2  0.993   
* indicates statistical significance of 90% or higher. 
 
Interestingly the level of consumption does not have a statistically significant effect 
on the level of crime.  What is evident however in this regression, as denoted by 
the asterisked terms, is that the long run or equilibrium level of crime is positively 
influenced by the stock of young males in the population - every 1% increase in the 
young male population (as a fraction of total population) raises burglary crime by 
3.8%.   Moreover crime appears to trend upwards, assuming all other things held 
constant,  by about 5.4% per year.   "Policy variables" such as the custody level 
and detection rate do tend to lower the level of crime.  A 1% increase in detection 
rates or the numbers in custody lowers the level of burglary by 3% and 0.9% 
respectively. 
We use the Johansen procedure to test for the existence of a long run relationship 
between these variables and are unable to reject the hypothesis that there is a 
unique cointegrating vector. 
The long term relationship between crime, demography and the economy, as 
described above, determines what might be called the ‘equilibrium’ level of crime. 
There is nothing permanent or final about this equilibrium, which may change over 
time in response to demographic and economic changes. It may also respond to a 




  27Table 3.2   Dynamic Error Correction Models 
 
  Standard Error 
Growth in Young Male Population  4.720*  1.285 
Growth in Consumption  -0.851*  0.323 
Growth in Custody Number  -0.410*  0.127 
Change in Detection Rates  -2.280*  0.471 
Year  -0.000 0.0009 
Error Correction Term (lag)  -0.650*  0.138 
Constant 0.549  1.984 
N  40   
Adjust R
2 0.7197   
 
Table 3.2 shows the results for the dynamic models which address these short-run 
influences but which also incorporate the error correction term from Table 3.1 to 
allow for the effect of the long run equilibrium relationship to be estimated.    The 
Table shows a regression which relates the growth in burglaries to the growth in 
the independent variables.  
The key findings here are: 
Consumption growth tends to depress property crime growth – a 1% increase in the 
rate of growth in consumption lowers the growth in crime levels by 0.85%.   This is 
consistent with a view that an improvement in the macroeconomic environment 
generates opportunities in the legitimate economy which raise the opportunity cost 
of crime. Note from Table 3.1 that this variable only has a statistically significant 
effect in the short run, there is no long run effect of macroeconomic prosperity on 
burglary. 
Changes in the growth rate of the young male population has a very large positive 
impact on crime – about 4.7% for every 1% increase in the rate of growth.  The 
criminal justice system variables remain important negative determinants of the 
growth in crime. Finally the negative coefficient on the Error Correction term means 
that the system display sensible dynamic properties. That is when the level of crime 
is below its long run level it tends to rise until it attains equilibrium and similarly it falls 
when it is above the long run.  
  28The results broadly accord with what theory and the international literature would 
suggest. For example Entorff and Spengler (2000) find the same effect of young 
males and the effect of deterrence for Germany as we find here. The importance of 
consumer spending is also found in a recent Italian study (Scorcu and Cellini 
1998).  
One issue, already raised in section 1, is the potential for criminal justice measures 
to be endogenous with respect to crime; that is criminal activity may influence 
policy responses.   It is difficult to deal with this issue.  As discussed in section 1 in 
order to do so we need to identify events which, for example, influence the 
detection rate but which themselves have no direct effect on crime
4.  These may 
only be available through some policy initiative which, for example, is piloted in a 
specific division or region in order to provide the research with a treatment group 
and a control group.   One possible solution in the context of time series modeling 
is to use lagged values of the criminal justice variables in a procedure known as 
instrumental variables.    This, when applied to the data used in table 3.1 and 3.2, 
shows no notable differences in the results, see the Appendix. So this suggests, 
that insofar as we can control for this problem, that no major distortion is introduced 
by treating crime as exogenous. However our instruments are probably not very 
good. 
Although the 2 step Grainger and Engle method are super consistent and 
asymptotically efficient there are small sample biases. Engle and Yoo(1991) 
propose a simple third step which gives estimates which are asymptotically 
equivalent to FIML. For a single cointegrating vector with weakly exogenous 
regressors this is particularly easy to implement. The table below gives the results 
of applying this method. The results are very similar to the two step. The main 
differences are a smaller (but still substantial) role for the demographic variable 
and a greater role for the deterrence variables, the elasticity with respect to custody 
being significantly bigger. 
 
                                                       
4 See Appendix 1 or Levitt (1996). 
  29Table 3.2:    
3 Step estimate of co-integrating vector 
 
 Estimated  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Log Young Males (as %  Population)  3.116  0.783 
Log Consumption  0.032  0.322 
Log Custody Rate   -1.259  0.246 
Detection Rate   -3.8556  0.474 
Trend   0.06  0.010 
Constant -86.37  12.24 
     
N  41   
     
 
Table 3.3 shows the results of the regression model as applied to the rural and 
urban data separately.  The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of G2 
crimes owing to the unavailability of the burglary data by region as explained 
earlier, so comparisons with Table 3.1 and 3.2 should bear this in mind.  Where 
relevant all explanatory variables are specific to the region under analysis. 
The interesting issues in Table 3.3 are (a) the extent to which there are differences 
between the rural and urban results and (b) the differences between these results 
and the aggregate burglary figures in Table 3.1.  
Comparing rural and urban we find that overall the results are very similar with the 
notable exception that the detection rate exerts a much more powerful effect in 
reducing crime in rural areas than urban. For every 1% change in the detection 
rate in rural areas the fall in crime is almost 3% compared to 1.3% in urban areas. 
Another interesting difference emerges when we look at the dynamic Error 
Correction model (in the bottom panel of Table 3.3). The effect of the growth in the 
young male population, so noticeable in the results in burglary, is shown to be only 
a feature of the urban sample.  
Comparing these results with those for burglary in Table 3.2 we find that the 
qualitative results are very similar but there are important quantitative differences in  
the size of the effects. The negative effect of consumption on this class of crime, 
for example, is almost three times greater than on burglary. 
  30Table 3.3  Rural/Urban Breakdown of Analysis 
 




 Coefficient  Standard  Error  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Long run relationship         
Young Males as % Adult Population (Log)  0.3041  3.0097  1.5261  1.6837 
Consumption (Log)  -0.9755 0.3997  -1.0996  0.2565 
Custody Rate (Log)  -0.6985 0.3460  -0.4942  0.1472 
Detection Rate   -2.7758 1.0680  -1.3144  0.2421 
% Population in urban areas  -0.0320 0.1333 0.2768  0.0717 
Trend   0.1038 0.0257  0.0148  0.0091 
Constant  -186.5408 39.9605 -25.3805 12.2139 
        
N  38   39   
Adjust R
2 0.9755   0.9956   
        
Error correction model        
        
Growth in Young Male Population  -3.3873 2.4175 4.4604  1.4800 
Growth in Consumption  -1.2208 0.5563  -1.1069  0.3208 
Growth in Custody Number  -0.1019 0.2097  -0.2776  0.1216 
Change in Detection Rates  -1.0529 0.5250  -1.3274  0.2907 
Change in % Population in urban areas  -0.0528 0.2399 0.1808  0.1843 
Year  -0.0027 0.0031 0.0001  0.0027 
Error Correction Term (lag)  -0.3639 0.1750  -0.6826  0.1554 
Constant  5.4295 6.1844  -0.1701  5.4055 
        
 38    38   
 0.4113    0.7806   
 
 
An alternative way of modeling crime is to consider the value of a crime defined as 
the total value of goods taken divided by the corresponding number of crimes.    
Table 3.4 shows the results from our two-step model with the dependent variable 
now based on this average inflation adjusted value of crime data (as opposed to 
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Table 3.4  Estimates based on Average Value of Crime  
 
    
Long run relationship  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Young Males as % Adult Population (Log)  2.0865* 1.2440 
Consumption (Log)  0.9284*  0.4336 
Custody Rate (Log)  -0.7717*  0.2813 
Detection Rate   -1.7818*  0.5533 
Trend   0.0117 0.0154 
Constant -15.1002  29.5715 
    
N 41   
Adjust R
2 0.9399  
    
Error correction model  Coefficient Standard  Error 
Growth in Young Male Population  0.5941 2.6880 
Growth in Consumption  1.6041  0.4277 
Growth in Custody Number  -0.5436  0.3231 
Change in Detection Rates  -2.2862 0.5951 
Year -0.0002  0.0021 
Error Correction Term (lag)  -0.6211  0.1466 
Constant 0.4430  4.2493 
    
N 40   
Adjust R
2 0.487  
 
In the long run relationship we see results that are broadly in line with the earlier 
findings based on the number of crimes.  The most notable difference is that 
consumption is a significant and positive determinant in both the short run and long 
run. This contrasts with the earlier finding that consumption only has a negative 
and short run effect when looking at the number of crimes. This implies that pro-
cyclical swings in consumer spending generate fewer but more lucrative crimes.  
This suggests that it is predominantly “small time” crime which is reduced when the 
macroeconomy improves. As the economy improves those involved in high value 
crime benefit from the greater prosperity in that individual crimes are more 
lucrative. On the other hand those involved in low value crime may be attracted 
away to the legitimate economy hence the finding of a positive effect on the value 
but not on the level. Also growth in the young male population does not have a 
significant effect on the value of crime. 
  32A number of alternative models were estimated throughout the completion of the 
report, which, for reasons of brevity, have been omitted.  However some important 
points are worth noting about these specifications. One variable that some will be 
surprised to see omitted from the list of explanatory variables is unemployment or 
some other direct measure of labour market activity such as the wage level.     
However, once we control for the explanatory variables used in the modelling, we 
were unable to find any robust effect from these labour market variables.  Given 
the mixed evidence on this in the international literature it is perhaps not that 
surprising. We also experimented with migration rates and with the level of burglary 
in the UK however in both cases we could eliminate them from the model.  
4 Conclusions 
In this paper we present an econometric analysis of the trend in Irish burglary crime 
between 1958 and 1998.   We have collected an extensive dataset based on 
Garda reports and other official publications and we use this data to develop an 
econometric model of burglary and the wider category of crimes against property 
with violence (known as Group 2 crimes in the published statistics).    The model 
explains burglary in terms of demographics, the macroeconomy and two 
characteristics of the criminal justice system.  We distinguish between the 
determinants of the level of crime (the long run or equilibrium level) and the short 
run dynamic behaviour of crime.    We develop the model for national data and 
also for an urban/rural split.   Moreover we consider data on the value of property 
stolen in Group 2 crimes as an additional indicator of crime level.   
Our key findings are that macroeconomic conditions as measured by the level of 
real consumer spending per capita have little effect on the equilibrium level of 
national burglary crime but, in the short run, growth in consumer spending does 
depress crime.   However consumption has a much more pronounced and positive 
effect on the average value of a burglary act.   Hence the evidence suggest that 
consumption affects the nature of the crime but not the overall frequency of crime 
in the long run.   
  33Demographic conditions are measured by the share of young males in the adult 
population. This variable has a positive effect on crime both in the long run and the 
short run.  The criminal justice system impacts on crime through two channels – 
the detection rate (reflecting the probability of being caught), and the numbers in 
custody for Group  2 crime (reflecting the consequences of being apprehended).   
Both have well determined negative effects on crime reflecting the deterrence 
effect and the direct effect of incarceration. 
Some difference can be noted when we consider the data separately for rural and 
urban populations.  Detection has twice as big an effect on crime in the rural areas 
possibly reflecting the more risk averse nature of criminals in these areas. One 
somewhat surprising result is that we were unable to find any robust effect from 
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                                          I(0) vs. I(1)                                       ( I1) vs. I(2) 
 
      
lags 0 2 0 2
log Burglary  0.650 0.296 0.000 0.005
log Male in Population  0.986 0.800 0.250 0.123
log Consumption per cap  0.965 0.971 0.003 0.003
log Prison population  0.962 0.901 0.000 0.001
Detection rate  0.800 0.539 0.000 0.008




Table A1 : IV estimate of long run burglary model 
 
 Estimated  Coefficient  Standard Error 
Log Young Males (as %  Population)  3.124137    1.045058    
Log Consumption  -.0742192    .3784929 
Log Custody Rate *  -1.394362    .4485604 
Detection Rate *  -3.972494    .7226298 
Trend   .0672152     .016202 
Constant  -103.8314    29.32473 
     
N  41   
Adjust R
2  0.993   
 
 
Instrumented variables: log custody  rate, detection rate 
Instruments: log burglary( t-2), log burglary (t-3), detection rate( t-3), detection rate (t-4), log custody 
rate (t-3), log custody rate (t-4) 
 
Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions: 8.134471  Chi-sq( 4)  P-value =  .0868 
 
Davidson-MacKinnon test of exogeneity:  1.051032  F( 2,33)  P-value =   .361 
 
  38